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POLICY BRIEF
German Council on Foreign Relations
How “Democratic  
Security” can  
Protect Europe  
from a Rising China
The Communist Party of China (CPC) plans for China to achieve  
effective global dominance by 2049. It is using the major global crisis  
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic to secure strategic advantage 
through propaganda and disinformation, assertive, sometimes aggres-
sive diplomacy, pursuing targeted investments, and offering “health 
cooperation.” The CPC has long targeted European business and polit-
ical elites to build constituencies of support. Europe must counter by 
building robust societies based on core democratic values. 
 – The CPC’s massive information control system contributed to the 
catastrophic spread of COVID-19. It is increasingly impacting Europe 
too. Party-cultivated networks in strategic sectors, including science 
and technology, deepen the challenge.
 – During the acute phase of the crisis at home, China hoarded PPE and 
medical supplies, causing shortages in Europe. This raises questions 
about global supply chain security.
 – Europe can protect its interests by countering disinformation, 
auditing and diversifying supply chains, building trusted alliances, 
screening foreign investments, clearly labeling propaganda sources, 
cracking down on United Front activity, prohibiting Chinese tech and 
taking cybersecurity seriously.
 – European governments should build democratic security1 in concert 
with small and medium countries around the world with a set of 
robust, yet flexible, society-wide responses to protect democratic 
sovereignty. 
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THE FLIGHT FORWARD
As the full scale of the pandemic became apparent in 
Europe in February 2020, the CPC was already de-
ploying well-honed propaganda and disinformation 
tools at home to gain practical and strategic high 
ground overseas, and to control the narrative about 
the health crisis. The result was a blizzard of diplo-
matic, information and economic activity at multiple 
levels including by the CPC General Secretary Xi Jin-
ping, Premier Li Keqiang, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, 
Chinese embassies overseas, and the United Front 
apparatus.2 
The CPC pumps millions of social media posts in-
to its domestic environment annually to “distract 
the public and change the subject.”3 This effort has 
gone global  via new networks of phony accounts, on 
Twitter for example, designed to amplify pro-CPC 
virus messaging. A flurry of anonymous bot accounts 
sprang up which were linked to Chinese diplomats in 
Europe and party-state media, forging new networks 
with existing or newly established “official messag-
ing” accounts belonging to the Foreign Ministry in 
Beijing and Chinese official media outlets. 
The result of this campaign is a network of multiple 
overlapping or disconnected mechanisms that am-
plify disinformation and propaganda. Key messages 
include that the virus did not come from China, only 
China can save other countries, and accusations that 
criticism of China is racist, rather than being about 
CPC policies or actions.
These networked CPC voices serve to drive the glob-
al conversation away from important issues such 
as actual events in China, including the censorship 
that contributed to the delay in reporting, and early 
cover-up of the virus. In propaganda environments, 
1 For an early examination of “democratic security,” a concept neglected in the decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall as democracies fell into an “end of 
history” sleep, see: Robert C. Johansen, “Real Security Is Democratic Security” in “Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,” Vol. 16, No. 2, “The Global Context of 
Democratization” (Spring 1991), pp. 209-241; https://www.jstor.org/stable/40644712 See also: Max Steuer, “Democratic Security,” Romaniuk, Thapa and 
Marton (eds), The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies, 2019. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
2  Alex Joske, “The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist party’s united front system,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
Policy Brief 32/2020, June 8, 2020. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you 
3  Gary King, Jennifer Pan, Margaret E. Roberts, “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged 
Argument,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 111 Issue 3, August 2017; https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/
article/how-the-chinese-government-fabricates-social-media-posts-for-strategic-distraction-not-engaged-argument/4662DB26E2685BAF1485F14369
BD137C
4  Xinhua, “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action,” June 7, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-06/07/c_139120424.htm Accessed July 6, 2020.
5  Josephine Ma, “Coronavirus: China’s first confirmed COVID-19 case traced back to November 17,” South China Morning Post, Mar. 13, 2020. https://www.
scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back Accessed July 6, 2020.
6  For the political-strategic nature of the BRI, see: Nadège Rolland, “Mapping the Footprint of Belt and Road influence operations,” Sinopsis, Aug. 12, 2019. 
https://sinopsis.cz/en/rolland-bri-influence-operations/
7  PRC Ministry of Defense Newspaper, “From Fighting the Virus, Seeing Future People’s Wars” Apr. 8, 2020. http://www.mod.gov.cn/jmsd/2020-04/08/
content_4863290.htm Accessed July 6, 2020.
what is not said is as important as what is. China’s 
timeline4 of the virus begins on December 27, 2019, 
though another report5 says cases dated back at 
least a month earlier, to November 17. Recently, the 
World Health Organization revised its account to 
make clear China did not inform it of the virus; in-
stead the WHO picked up a report from other sourc-
es and questioned the Chinese government, which 
confirmed the problem some days later. In official 
communications, China continues to present itself 
as a hapless first victim of the virus, likening it to a 
“force majeure.” 
Offers of health cooperation to foreign governments 
and institutions then surged, as part of a so-called 
“Health Silk Road” (健康丝绸之路) which has been 
part of China’s geo-strategic Belt and Road Initia-
tive (BRI, 一带一路) for some years now. The former 
has found its moment to shine during the pandem-
ic.6 In addition, the CPC declared a “people’s war” on 
the virus, expanding the established Maoist concept 
of permanent warfare. According to a report on the 
website of the Ministry of Defense, the virus “opened 
up a new realm of the people’s war.”7
DIPLOMACY AND GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE
In China’s “whole of state” system (举国体制, in En-
glish “whole of government” or “whole of society), in-
stitutions and policies are interconnected, and action 
can be swift. The party’s diplomatic policy, known as 
“Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” 
(中国特色大国外交理论), aims to shift the global order 
to place China center-stage, replacing competitive in-
ternational relations with “harmonious” relations ul-
timately shaped and directed by the CPC, backed by 
its sweeping concept of state security, which is de-
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signed to have global reach and to be at least partially 
pre-emptive in nature.8 The crisis “injects inner mean-
ing” to the BRI policy, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said 
in April in an article in Qiushi (Seeking Truth) – a CPC 
theory magazine.9
On January 5, 2020, even as the virus was spreading 
in China and around the world – aided by approxi-
mately 5 million people who traveled from the city of 
Wuhan to national and international destinations be-
fore the city was locked down on January 23 –, the 
Central Party History and Documents Research In-
stitute in Beijing published a book titled “Excerpts of 
Xi Jinping’s Thought on Great Power Diplomacy with 
Chinese Characteristics”. The book defines China’s 
goals as achieving “national rejuvenation,” reshaping 
global governance, and ensuring foreign affairs work 
does not stray from “central party” control, which is 
code for Xi and the standing committee of the Polit-
buro keeping a firm grip on foreign affairs.10 
This interconnected vision is also expressed in 
Xi Jinping’s counter-universalist theory of glob-
al governance – the “community of human destiny” 
(人类命运共同体). The “community of human desti-
ny,” which Xi first publicly spoke about in a speech at 
the Moscow State Institute of International Relations 
in 2013, seeks to replace, or at least “repurpose,” the 
post-1945 world order to the benefit of China.11
Within China, the party’s legitimacy also rests on its 
ability to deliver healthcare to its citizens. So China’s 
global “health cooperation” has gained new urgency 
since the party seeks to protect its domestic power 
by shaping its external environment.12 “China will ac-
tively strengthen its ‘One Belt One Road’ health co-
operation in order to build a ‘Health Silk Road’ to-
gether,” Foreign Minister Wang wrote in the Qiushi 
article.
8  The extraterritorial nature of the CPC’s concept of state security is clearly spelled out in the new, “National Security Law” for Hong Kong, passed on June 
30, 2020. See Art. 38.
9  Foreign Minister Wang Yi (in Chinese, original publication), “Taking Xi Jinping’s Foreign Policy Thought as a Guide, Push and Build the ‘Human Destiny 
Community’ via Global Cooperation in Fighting the Virus,” Qiushi (Seeking Truth) magazine, Apr. 15, 2020;  
http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2020-04/15/content_5502818.htm In English: “Following Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy to build a community with a 
shared future for mankind through international cooperation against COVID-19,” China Daily, Apr. 16, 2020. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202004/16/
WS5e97b899a3105d50a3d16958.html Accessed July 6, 2020.
10  State Council Information Office via Xinhua, “Xi Jinping on Extracts on the Theory of ‘Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics’,” Jan. 5, 2020; 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2020-01/05/c_1125423757.htm Accessed July 6, 2020
11  Xi Jinping, via Xinhua, “Walking Towards a ‘Community of Human Destiny,’” Nov. 24, 2019; http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-
11/24/c_1125268369.htm. Accessed July 6, 2020. For an English account see: Nadège Rolland, “Beijing’s Vision for a Reshaped International Order,” The 
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief Vol. 18 Issue 3, Feb. 26, 2018; https://jamestown.org/program/beijings-vision-reshaped-international-order/
12  See, for example: Xinhua, “Health Silk Road promotes cooperation during COVID-19 pandemic - Turkish experts,” May 7, 2020;  
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-05/07/c_139038211.htm Accessed July 6, 2020.
13  Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “President Xi Jinping Speaks with Finnish President Sauli Niinistö on the 
Phone,” Apr. 14, 2020; https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1770059.shtml Accessed July 6, 2020.
14  Andre Rettman, “China Suspected of bio-espionage in Heart of EU,” euobserver, May 6, 2020;  
https://euobserver.com/science/148244 Accessed July 6, 2020. Accessed July 6, 2020
One example of stepped up “health cooperation” ac-
tivity in recent months was a telephone call between 
Xi and Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, during which 
Xi offered to deepen public health cooperation with 
Finland, referenced China’s vision of a “human des-
tiny community,” and assured Niinistö that China 
would supply essential medical goods again if need-
ed, according to Xinhua.13
In the same call, Xi reportedly said, “China is priori-
tizing the resumption and expansion of medical sup-
ply production. This will help keep the global in-
dustrial and supply chains stable and contribute to 
international cooperation against the disease and 
stability of the global economy”. In the transcript 
of the call, Xi refers more than once to globaliza-
tion, showing how important it is to the CPC. Chi-
na is keen to continue the trading terms of the World 
Trade Organization, which it joined in 2001, but 
which the United States says China is gaming.
Importantly, Xi also made clear that he wanted Fin-
land to continue to deliver knowledge and technolo-
gy to China, including in “ICT and life sciences.” The 
CPC is anxious to make sure the virus does not dis-
rupt its global, decades-old efforts to import tech-
nology and know-how into China. The Belgian secu-
rity service, VSSE, said in early May 2020 that, from 
China’s point of view, “As part of the ambitious ‘Made 
in China 2025’ project, which provides for rapid de-
velopment of know-how in China itself, all available 
means must be used to import as much knowledge 
as possible into China.”14 
LOOKING FORWARD TO 2049
The year 2049 will mark the 100th anniversary of the 
1949 Communist revolution. By then, the CPC aims to 
achieve “socialist modernization and national rejuve-
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nation,” and “national strength and international in-
fluence.” This vision of a modern, strong, rejuvenat-
ed and influential China is the “China Dream.”  It is to 
be realized through “Xi Jinping Thought,” or, to give 
it its full name, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”15 It is even 
written into the Chinese Constitution. “National Re-
juvenation” includes being “a talent superpower” and 
having forces “capable of … winning wars.” Xi’s speech 
at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China on October 18, 2017 remains a key guide for 
understanding China’s plans.16 These are ambitious, 
and relevant to today: a child born in Europe this year 
will still be under 30 years old in 2049, perhaps in the 
early stages of her career, or starting a family.
Two “centenary goals” mark the milestones of na-
tional rejuvenation. Both are tied to major anniver-
15  Xinhua, “Backgrounder: Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” March 17, 2018;  
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/17/c_137046261.htm Accessed July 6, 2020.
16  Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China Oct. 18, 2017;  
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf Accessed July 6, 2020.
saries in party history, thus reinforcing party legit-
imacy. The first, to be achieved by 2021 – the 100th 
anniversary of the founding of the CPC in Shanghai 
in 1921 – is an “overall moderately prosperous soci-
ety.” This modest-sounding goal has in reality driv-
en China’s high economic growth for decades and 
has been accompanied by a policy of “military-civil-
ian fusion.”
The second centenary goal is divided into two 
phases. The first, from 2020 to 2035, aims to estab-
lish a leading position in global innovation, science 
and technology. “Made in China 2025” is one of the 
few elements of the plan familiar to people in Eu-
rope, yet it is only one step on the planned road to 
global power. Alongside this policy, China has rolling, 
15-year-long, “Medium- and Long-Term Plans for 
Science and Technology Development”. These plans 
10 PRIORITY SECTORS FOR “MADE IN CHINA 2025”
Published in 2015, China’s state “Made in China” policy aims for global leadership in 10 major 
categories of science and technology. These are:
Source: State Council document no. 28, “Made in China 2025,” published May 19, 2015: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/
content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm
NEW INFOR M ATION  
TECHNOLOGIES,  
INCLUDING A I  A ND  
DATA A NA LYTICS
NEW ENERGIES
AEROSPACE
FARMING  
TECHNOLOGIES 
OCEA N  
ENGINEER ING
NEW PHYSICAL  
MATERIALS
RAILWAYS
BIOTECHNOLOGY  
AND MEDICAL  
EQUIPMENT
DIGITA L CONTROL  
A ND ROBOTICS, 
INCLUDING A DVA NCED  
M A NUFACTUR ING
ELECTRONICS,  
INCLUDING  
SEMICONDUCTORS
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detail how to identify and extract technology from 
around the world and bring it to China to develop, 
“re-innovate,” and commercialize. For China, Europe 
is a key source of high-level science and technology. 
By allowing China to obtain its technology, Europe 
fuels China’s rise.
The second phase of the second centenary goal, from 
2035 to 2049, aims to achieve “new heights … in ev-
ery dimension of material, political, cultural and eth-
ical, social, and ecological advancement,” ending with 
sufficient military force to win wars in which tech-
nology plays a key role. Other aspects include rural 
revitalization and the “modernization of China’s sys-
tem and capacity for governance.” All of these, Xi said 
in the 2017 party congress speech, will allow Chinese 
people “to enjoy happier, safer and healthier lives.” 
CPC leadership remains non-negotiable in this pro-
cess because, as Xi said, “the path of socialist polit-
ical advancement with Chinese characteristics … is 
a requisite for maintaining the very nature of the 
Party and fulfilling its fundamental purpose”. The 
self-referential nature of that statement is deliber-
ate. There is wider consultation and contestation by 
the party and government, but cooptation is the goal, 
to be achieved through the United Front and other 
methods.
MAKING EUROPE “CHOOSE 
NEUTRALITY” IN THE 
COMPETITION BETWEEN CHINA 
AND THE UNITED STATES
China has long sought to “divide and rule” in 
Europe, to prevent common “anti-China” policies 
developing on the continent. This is relatively 
easy due to the EU’s system of consensus voting, 
whereby one country of 27 can nix collective 
positions. China seeks to neutralize Europe as an 
ally of the United States, in order to facilitate its 
own rise.
A book first published in 2013 titled “Inertia of 
History: China and the World by 2023,” by Yan 
Xuetong described three categories of European 
countries to be handled according to their 
self-interests. Illustrating this approach, a chap-
ter titled “Great Powers’ Diplomacy: Strategies 
for China,” includes sections on “Turning Germany 
into a strategic economic partner,” and “Making 
France treasure the friendship.”
Yan writes, “In the next 10 years the EU’s internal 
disagreements will increase and its ability to 
speak with a unified voice on foreign affairs 
will assume a downward trend, so it will be 
impossible for the EU to implement a consistent 
policy toward China.” He adds, “Given that the 
EU’s policies regarding China conflict with each 
other, the idea of improving China’s relations with 
European countries through improving its rela-
tions with the EU will be unrealistic; China will 
only be able to make its Europe policy focus on 
improving bilateral relations with major European 
powers. China needs to group European countries 
into three categories”. 
Friends: “All-weather strategic, cooperative 
relationships” of “political friendship,” to be built 
with Greece, Spain, and Serbia. These countries 
have “the capability to prevent the EU from 
adopting common anti-China policies” by nixing 
collective votes in Brussels. Mostly in Southern 
and Southeastern Europe. Includes Hungary.
Frenemies: “Those that are unwilling to politically 
oppose China because of economic interests,” 
including Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom. To be neutralized by appealing to their 
strong and individual economic interest. Mostly 
in western Europe.
Political Enemies: A “hands-off policy” for “po-
litically prejudiced” countries mostly in Northern 
and Eastern Europe such as Sweden, Norway, 
Poland. Approach: “not turning down any comers 
and not going out to proselytize.” Yan adds, “The 
growing trend of the bipolarization of the inter-
national configuration will impel them to give up 
their policies of opposing China.”
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Importantly, the “China Dream” involves influenc-
ing people and systems around the world. United 
Front and related kinds of activity, for example out-
reach conducted by the core “Chinese People’s Asso-
ciation for Friendship with Foreign Countries,” is part 
of this architecture of influence which aims to build 
constituencies of support around the world for CPC 
policies and goals, among both overseas Chinese and 
non-Chinese. In particular, it directs efforts at in-
fluential groups and individuals, including political, 
business, social and academic elites.17
NUDGING EUROPE 
TOWARD NEUTRALITY
China’s true target is the United States. It has long 
seen the European Union, a US ally, as internally di-
vided and therefore weak and manipulable. Com-
pared to China’s central command, which facili-
tates clear communication, the EU’s multitude of 
voices make it more difficult to speak with a unified 
voice. What’s more, China sees that voice weakening 
over time. China has recognized that it is not use-
ful to cultivate a bloc-level relationship, but to focus 
on bilateral ties instead. The EU’s “consensus vote” 
rule means China only has to win one dissenting vote 
in Brussels to nix whatever it defines as “anti-Chi-
na” policies. 
This sobering assessment of the EU was detailed by 
Yan Xuetong, an influential scholar at Tsinghua Uni-
versity.18 In one section of his thesis, “Nudging Eu-
rope toward neutrality”, Yan said China could pre-
vent “collective anti-China decisions” by dividing 
member states into groups and cultivating them 
accordingly. According to Yan, China has split EU 
member states into three constituencies which 
could broadly be described as “friends,” “frenemies,” 
and “enemies.”
17  Tatlow, 2019. In its 2019 report, published July 8, 2020, Germany’s federal domestic security agency, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, newly 
addresses these political influencing and interfering activities by the CPC in Germany. https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/vsbericht-2019.pdf
18  Yan Xuetong, “Inertia of History: China and the World by 2023”, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2019, translated by Alexander A. Bowe, 
https://www.cambridgescholars.com/inertia-of-history
19  “Introductory statement by Commissioner Phil Hogan at Informal meeting of EU Trade Ministers,” European Commission, Apr. 16. 2020;  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/hogan/announcements/introductory-statement-commissioner-phil-hogan-informal-
meeting-eu-trade-ministers_en
20  “Hersteller von Medizinprodukten geht an Chinesen,“ Legal Tribune Online, Apr. 14, 2020;  
https://www.lto.de/recht/kanzleien-unternehmen/k/orrick-aeonmed-china-erwerb-heyer-medical/ 
21  The Guardian, “Entire UK order of 250 Chinese ventilators ditched over danger to lives ,” May 1, 2020;  
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/apr/30/entire-order-of-250-chinese-ventilators-were-useless-despite
22  ScandAsia, “Chinese state-owned company bought 12.67 percent of Norwegian airline’s share,” May 25, 2020;  
https://scandasia.com/chinese-state-owned-company-bought-12-67-percent-of-norwegian-airlines-share/ Accessed July 6, 2020.
23  Karen M. Sutter, Andrew B. Schwarzenberg, Michael D. Sutherland “COVID-19: China Medical Supply Chains and Broader Trade Issues,” Congressional 
Research Serrvice; https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46304
24  Ibid.
THE ECONOMY
Successful investments by Chinese companies in-
to critical European industries, including medical 
equipment and aviation, are continuing during the 
pandemic. While EU rules have been tightened and 
officials are more risk-aware, protections remain 
inadequate.19 
In March 2020, Heyer Medical, a 130-year-old Ger-
man medical equipment company specializing 
in ventilators, was acquired by Aeonmed, a Bei-
jing-based medical equipment company.20 Aeonmed 
was recently embroiled in a scandal in Britain when 
its shipment of 250 ventilators was found to be de-
fective.21 In May, China’s state-owned Bank of Chi-
na acquired a 12.67 percent share in Norwegian Air 
through a chain of subsidiaries.22
While China offered aid to other countries during the 
pandemic, it was careful to package it as a high-pro-
file gift, to win positive attention among European 
politicians and publics consumed by crisis. All the 
while it was practicing economic statecraft in ways 
that damaged other countries. 
For example, on February 6, 2020, China’s Ministry 
of Commerce published a list of 51 medical suppli-
ers and distributors in 14 countries to target for PPE 
supplies.23 In addition, according to Chinese customs 
statistics, China imported 2.02 billion facemasks be-
tween January 24 and February 29, at the height of 
its battle with the pandemic (normally China is a 
major exporter of facemasks).24 Furthermore, in the 
first two months of 2020, exports of the category of 
goods that includes surgical gowns dropped 13 per-
cent compared to the previous year, and imports 
rose a remarkable 40,582 percent. Similar patterns – 
though less dramatic – are seen for most categories 
of PPE and medical equipment, including ventilators 
(exports dropped 20 percent, imports rose 174 per-
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cent). China is a major global supplier of PPE, medical 
devices, antibiotics, and active pharmaceutical ingre-
dients, so increasing imports and decreasing exports 
led to shortages of critical medical supplies in Eu-
rope and elsewhere. One way of framing the issue is 
that China “broke” globalization, since its sheer size, 
and habitual use of economic statecraft (political or 
state intervention in the economy), created supply 
chain instability for the rest of the world.
Shortages in basic consumer items such as face-
masks and hand sanitizer in European pharmacies 
25  Xu Yousheng, deputy minister of the United Front Work Department, Qiushi via cpcnews.cn, “Fighting the Epidemic in Peace and Harmony,” Apr. 17, 
2020. In Chinese: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0417/c64102-31677509.html  
In English: https://www.tellerreport.com/news/2020-04-16---xu-yousheng--fighting-for-the-epidemic-situation-in-peace-and-harmony-.ry1snHr_L.html 
Accessed July 6, 2020. For an account of how the UF system worked in Canada during the early stages of COVID-19, see, Sam Cooper, “United Front groups 
in Canada helped Beijing stockpile coronavirus safety supplies,” Apr. 30. 2020. Accessed July 8, 2020.
beginning in January had another cause, too. In ad-
dition to the trade policies and behaviors examined 
above, the United Front organized and encouraged 
shipments of goods to China in bulk, often via ac-
companied excess baggage on commercial flights.25 
Some other activity was genuinely individual, unre-
lated to political influence systems. Yet where it was 
managed by groups with provable ties to the CPC, 
the EU should scrutinize it, to prevent such short-
ages going forward. There are hundreds, perhaps 
thousands, of such United Front- (or other CPC-
) guided, controlled, or supported groups in Eu-
CHANGE IN CHINA’S EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SELECT MEDICAL PRODUCTS
YTD 2019 (January-February) vs. YTD 2020 (January-February), in %
EXPORT IMPORT
M ED ICA L,  S URGICA L  
OR LA BOR ATORY  
STER IL IZER S
IM M UNOLOGICA L  
PROD UCTS
S PECTACLES A ND 
GOGGLES
M ED ICA L  
VENTILATOR S  
A ND R ES PIR ATION 
A PPA R ATUS
-34 +66
-30 +197
-20 +174
-20 +185
-16 +2,176
-13 +40,582GA R M ENTS,  M A D E-UP OF FABRICS OF FELTS A ND NONWOVENS  ( INCLUD ING D IS POS A BLE HOSPITAL 
GOWNS A ND LA B COATS)
M A DE-UP TEXTILE 
A RTICLES*
Source: CRS analysis with data from China Customs and Global Trade Atlas (March 31, 2020), from Sutter, Schwarzen-
berg and Sutherland, “COVID-19: ChinaMedical Supply Chains and Broader Trade Issues,” Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Apr. 6, 2020. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46304  (accessed June 6,2020).
*N95 and other protective masks have historically been classified under tariff subheading 6307.99.9889, which includes other miscellaneous textile article 
made from similar materials
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rope with ties to the overseas Chinese community, 
and local European business, political and academic 
elites, as well as civil society organizations.26
DEMOCRATIC SECURITY 
For Europe, all this raises the question of what to do 
to protect its democratic sovereignty. The concept of 
“democratic security” provides a particularly helpful 
way to think and act. However, it’s important to un-
derstand that we are only beginning to identify how 
to manage the CPC problem, therefore much work 
remains to be done to define and detail this concept. 
Some initial key points:
• Democratic security aims to raise awareness 
and educate. People in democratic nations must 
understand that democracy requires security, or 
protection, and will not necessarily triumph, or even 
just survive, by virtue of being a humane system.
• Democratic security aims to provide democracies 
with a set of practical tools and intellectual/moral 
concepts to protect democracy, recognizing that 
traditional, “hard” (military) security, while neces-
sary, is insufficient on its own. An antagonistic power 
trying to limit the freedom of action of democracies 
by means other than military, for example economic 
statecraft or disinformation, must be countered by 
other measures, too. 
• Crucially, democratic security must be robust and 
flexible. It must draw on all areas of government 
and civil society and offer a range of measures. This 
will enable it to effectively counter the multiple lev-
els on which the CPC influences and interferes in 
democracies. 
• Democratic security must counter the situation 
where democracies are in a position of “provocative 
weakness” vis à vis authoritarian states. At the same 
time, it should not overly securitize democratic 
systems, which should remain open, but highly 
resilient.27 Democratic security should be “politically 
practical as well as morally sensitive,” as Robert C. 
Johansen wrote.28
26  Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Mapping China-in-Germany,” Sinopsis, October 2, 2019, https://sinopsis.cz/en/mapping-china-in-germany/
27  Thanks to the European Values Center for Security, Prague and Berlin, for discussions on this topic. The original concept of “provocative weakness” 
belongs to Fritz Kraemer, the German-born Pentagon strategist who fled Germany in 1933, arriving in the US in 1939;  
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/kraemer-fritz-gustav-anton
28  Robert C. Johansen, “Real Security Is Democratic Security” in “Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,” Vol. 16, No. 2, “The Global Context of 
Democratization” (Spring 1991), pp. 209-241. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40644712
• Democratic security requires a robust system of 
alliances of democratic nations. Here, Europe can 
play a major role (see below). By paying attention to 
democratic security, Europe will naturally improve 
its relationship with the US, which sees Europe as 
unwilling to take responsibility for its own security, 
including political security, leading to widespread 
irritation on both sides.
WHAT CAN EUROPE DO? 
Europeans must assume that the CPC is pushing for 
strategic and economic advantage, with the eco-
nomic and health crisis caused by the pandemic of-
fering a window of opportunity. This assumption is 
a necessary prerequisite for combating China’s op-
portunism, especially since European tools are easi-
ly disrupted by member state disagreement. The EU 
has economic and regulatory powers, but these are 
slow-moving.
In addition, China may simply ignore or break agree-
ments; see, for example, its imposition of a harsh 
state security law on Hong Kong, contrary to its 
own domestic and international agreements. In ad-
dition, Article 38 of the new law is extra-territorial 
in nature, criminalizing speech by people around the 
world. Europe must assume that this is a “trial bal-
loon” and China is testing reactions. 
A resilient economy is a key factor in making Europe 
shock-proof and strengthening democratic security, 
but this will not come without some costs. The EU 
must think through who, and which domestic indus-
tries, will be affected by a push to counter unwanted 
CPC influence and interference, and consider how to 
support them as it moves into the phase of allocat-
ing large amounts of money to recover from the eco-
nomic shock of the virus. A key example is Germany’s 
automotive industry. 
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There are ten steps Europe can take to stand its 
ground against the CPC: 
1.  Strengthen democratic resilience: Sweden’s plan for a Psychological Defense Agency should 
be replicated in each EU country and connect to 
Brussels.29 This would identify and counter disinfor-
mation and other malign influences, support open 
source research and tracking. As a Swedish govern-
ment report noted, “psychological defense should be 
viewed as a natural part of safeguarding the open so-
ciety, freedom of opinion, and the freedom and inde-
pendence of Sweden.” 
2.  Audit Supply Chains: Engage in a reassessment of supply chains and technologies across a 
range of goods, from PPE to pharmaceuticals to 5G. 
Regarding 5G, decisions to use China-made technol-
ogy and parts can and should be reversed, and deep-
er commitments refused, in the name of democrat-
ic security which includes technological and internet 
security, and data privacy and integrity.30 
3.  Limit Opportunities for Disinformatio: Address the expansion of China’s massive infor-
mation control system through limiting penetration 
of its telecoms infrastructure in Europe, and by mon-
itoring more closely propaganda and disinformation 
aimed at weakening European democratic sovereign-
ty. An East Stratcom Task force, set up in 2015 within 
the European External Action Service, deals primarily 
with Russian propaganda. This should be expanded to 
include a full, language- and ethnographically fluent, 
team focused on China.31 Consider moving it to the 
Values and Transparency Commissioner since propa-
ganda and disinformation have domestic impact. 
4.  Diversify Supply Chains: Help businesses to diversify supply chains away from China. Ja-
pan’s “relocation fund,” which is in excess of $2 bil-
29  In Swedish, “En ny myndighet för att stärka det psykologiska försvaret” (A new authority to strengthen psychological defense),  Government Official 
Investigations, SOU 2020:29, Stockholm 2020;  
https://www.regeringen.se/49bbbd/contentassets/e3a84a5fd7144c6a95a1eb90a2bbfec0/en-ny-myndighet-for-att-starka-det-psykologiska-forsvaret-
sou-2020-29.pdf See also, Christina La Cour, “Governments Countering Disinformation: The Case of Sweden”, Disinfo Portal, updated November 8, 2019,  
https://disinfoportal.org/governments-countering-disinformation-the-case-of-sweden/ Accessed July 8, 2020.
30  Sahin & Tatlow, above. 
31  East Stratcom Task Force website, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ 
32  Francesco Alberti, The Asean Post, “Japan switching manufacturing to ASEAN,” Apr. 19, 2020; 
https://theaseanpost.com/article/japan-switching-manufacturing-asean See also, Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/
covid-19/index.html#latest Both accessed July 8, 2020.
33  Charles Edel, “Democracies need alliances to secure vital supply chains,” ASPI, The Strategist, May 6, 2020;  
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/democracies-need-alliances-to-secure-vital-supply-chains/
34  Alex Hearn, The Guardian, “UK-based Chinese news network CGTN faces possible ban,” July 6, 2020;  
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/jul/06/uk-based-chinese-news-network-cgtn-faces-possible-ban Accessed July 8, 2020.
35  State Department, press statement, June 22, 2020: “Designation of Additional Chinese Media Entities as Foreign Missions.”  
https://www.state.gov/designation-of-additional-chinese-media-entities-as-foreign-missions/
lion, and part of its COVID-19 economic stimulus, has 
begun a process for companies seeking to move pro-
duction out of China back to Japan, or other locations 
in Southeast Asia, for example.32 The same could be 
done through Europe’s economic recovery fund. 
5.  Build Trusted Alliances: Expand positive alliances and work with “likeminded” partners 
and neighbors to build democratically minded, se-
cure trade systems. This “security through great-
er diversification,” as one report put it, necessitates 
revisiting the rules of global trade and encouraging 
certain countries to become trusted suppliers.33
6.  Screen Foreign Investments: Quicker, wider and deeper action to block unwanted foreign 
acquisitions to protect European sovereignty. An in-
vestment screening mechanism initiated last year 
by the EU, to take effect on October 1, 2020, goes 
in the right direction but remains inadequate and is 
voluntary.
7. Label Propaganda Sources: Highlight the  activities of Chinese entities that censored vi-
rus outbreaks in the November to January period, in-
cluding state-run media such as CCTV/CGTN, the 
Chinese state TV broadcaster. These are implicat-
ed in broadcasting forced confessions linked to tor-
ture.34 A first step would be to designate CPC media 
in Europe as “foreign missions,” as the US has done 
to nine, including CGTN, People’s Daily, and Global 
Times, in an effort to force transparency since they 
are not editorially independent but “embody the par-
ty’s will [and] safeguard the party’s authority.”35 
8.  Crack Down on United Front Activity: Counter United Front activity by drawing up a toolbox 
based on Australian or US foreign agent registration 
laws. This would oblige transparency on these orga-
nizations and educate citizens at home, thus con-
tributing strongly to creating democratic security. 
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Not to do so damages the security of all people, in-
cluding Chinese citizens, who do not wish to be as-
sociated with the CPC. It is of great importance to 
note that Chinese people in Europe also require pro-
tection from the CPC. 
9.  Prohibit Chinese Tech: Prohibit EU bodies, member state governments, and employees, 
from conducting official business on Chinese owned 
or controlled tech platforms such as WeChat or oth-
er Tencent products to push back against both infor-
mation control and technology surveillance. A recent 
decision by the Bundeswehr to close its TikTok ac-
count is a model that should be followed by others. 
10.  Take Cybersecurity Seriously: Increase funding for civil society organizations and 
businesses in Europe to help people evade censor-
ship systems such as China’s Great Firewall, and se-
cure their own online privacy, including everywhere 
where these are growing in countries closely al-
lied with China, for example in African countries. 
This should apply to US companies, too, and Europe 
should work together with interested US companies, 
states and citizens. Overall, the EU has standards- 
and norm-setting powers and should widen them in 
the technological arena. This is a unique and poten-
tially powerful way for European nations and the EU 
to build a global constituency of support, ground-
ed in the wish for, and necessity of, privacy in a net-
worked world, which is itself a vital part of demo-
cratic security.
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